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"[Ilt  was tyme to hide when  Mr. Topclyfe came[.]"'
- Robert Southwell,  S.J.
During the trial of the so-called  Powder Men--Guy  Fawkes  and his
co-conspirators in the  Gunpowder  Plot to blow  up Parliament  with  the
King, Queen,  and heir apparent all in attendance-the  King's Attorney
General Sir Edward Coke presented  into evidence  a curious manuscript
with two titles.  The text's original name was A Treatise of Equivocation,
but that had been scratched out and replaced with a new title, A Treatise
Against Lying and Fraudulent  Dissimulation. It had been  discovered in
the rooms which one of the conspirators had used in the Inner Temple,
and mere possession  of this book, Coke clearly  thought, spoke loudly of
all the defendants' guilt.2  By delaying the trial long enough to secure this
*  Thanks  go to Ruth  Wedgwood  and  H.  Jefferson  Powell  for  reading  earlier  versions of  this
essay; to the Kirkland Endowment and the staff of the Henry E. Huntington Library for making the
first  wave of research  possible;  to  Christine  Stapp for  able  bibliographical  assistance;  and  to the
current  administration and  the  library staff at  Hamilton  College,  who  provided  first-rate research
support  in a gesture of sheer generosity.
1. Pierre Janelle, Robert Southwell the  Writer: A Study in Religious Inspiration (London: Sheed
& Ward, 1935),  83  (quoting manuscript notes of an anonymous Catholic who attended Southwell's
trial).  According  to  Janelle  and  his  source,  Southwell  made  this  remark  to the  court after  his
conviction on a charge of being a Catholic priest within England, made treasonous by  27 Eliz. cap. 2
(1585)  (see note  5 below).  Topclffe, the notorious pursuivant  entitled by Elizabethan  authorities to
maintain  a private torture chamber for the Catholics he apprehended, had captured  Southwell and
subjected  him  to repeated  tortures  preparatory  to his indictment and  trial.  The  epigraph  to this
essay  is  Southwell's  response to Topcliffe's  "ralinge"  accusation  that  he  had  captured  the  Jesuit
"hidden  in  the  tylles  of  the  house  [a  hiding  hole],  amongst  his  Goddes,  (meaninge  Puctores
[Pictures]),  and  in  the  same,  Parsons  cypher."  Id.  Topcliffe's  representation  of  Southwell  as
engaged in a triple seeming - hiding in  a priest hole not only his person but also idolatrous images
and a cypher  enclosed  among  those  images - aptly  encapsulates  the official  portraiture  of Jesuit
equivocators.
2.  "The  Trial  of  Robert  Winter,  Thomas  Winter,  Guy  Fawkes,  John  Grant,  Ambrose
Rookwood, Rob. Keyes, Thomas Bates, and Sir Everard  Digby,  at Westminster, for High Treason,
being Conspirators in the Gunpowder-Plot,"  January 27,  1606, in T.B. Howell, ed., State Trials, vol.
II (London:  Longman,  1816),  180.  Subsequent references  will  be to "The  Gunpowder Trial."  The
controversy  that  raged  over  the  book  Coke  presented  has  been  capably  reviewed  by  Frank  L.
Huntley, "Macbeth and the Background  of Jesuitical  Equivocation,"  PMLA  79  (1964):  390-400.
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manuscript,  Coke  ensured  that  he  would  be  able  to  continue  in  a
prosecutorial tradition he had established in the trial of the Jesuit Robert
Southwell-a tradition  of proving treason  against  English  Catholics by
representing  them as ready equivocators.
The Treatise of Equivocation  3  was written to instruct priests sent on a
"mission"  established by the Society of Jesus, whose aim was to preserve
the  Catholic  Church  in  the  newest  heathen  territory,  England.  The
Treatise  prepared  priests to face the perilous questions asked of them by
official  interrogators,  who  as  enforcers  of the  Anglican  settlement  had
devised  a  series  of interrogatories  widely  known  as  the  "bloody  ques-
tions"  because  they  could  force  a  Catholic  priest  to  elect  between  the
Queen  and  the Pope.4  The  stakes  were  high:  the  penalty  for  being  a
priest in England,  an act of treason, was  death by public torture.5
Catholic priests in England  thus bore an interdicted identity.  Though
Jesuit priests  came to England prepared for martyrdom, the Order  also
prepared them to disguise themselves, particularly to engage in the prac-
tice of equivocation  so reviled  by  Coke.  According  to  the  Treatise of
Equivocation, a Catholic priest in England was entitled,  under appropri-
ate circumstances,  to resort to any one  of four methods  of baffling his
audience.  First,  he  could  use  words  having  more  than  one  common
meaning-for example, declaring that  a priest "lyeth  not in my  house,"
and meaning that he does not tell lies there.  Second, he could give only
one of several possible answers to a question-for instance, declaring that
he came  to a friend's  house  to have  dinner and omitting  to mention  a
purpose to celebrate mass as well.  Third, he might exploit the ambigui-
3.  Internal  evidence  demonstrates  that  this  manuscript  was  completed  after  the execution  of
Robert  Southwell  in  1595.  The  manuscript,  bearing  the  imprimatur  of George  Blackwell,  the
Archpriest of England, has been  lightly edited in  a hand  which can be identified  as that of Father
Garnet, then head of the Jesuits'  English mission, and bears several  notations by Sir Edward Coke.
If printed at all in  the sixteenth century,  the text survives to us only  in manuscript form and in  the
1851  edition  printed  by  David  Jardine.  The  latter  is relied  upon  here  and will  be  referred  to as
Treatise of Equivocation in  subsequent  notes.  David  Jardine,  ed.,  A  Treatise of Equivocation
(London: Longman,  1851).  On the provenance of the manuscript, see A.E.  Malloch, "Father  Henry
Garnet's  Treatise of Equivocation,"  Recusant History 15(6)  (1981):  387-395.
4.  According to P.J. Holmes, the so-called "bloody questions"  were set forth among a collection
of cases of conscience written at Rheims in  1578-79  for use by seminary priests preparing to join  the
English mission.  These questions were:  "When  did you say or heare  mass last?";  "Whether  is  the
quene  ane hereticke  or  schismatike[?]";  "Whether  is the  Quene  stille notwithstandinge  the  popes
Excomunicatione?";  and  "Whether  may  the  quene  be  deposed  for  any  facte  by  any  authority
hereafter?"  P.J.  Holmes, ed., Elizabethan Casuistry, Catholic  Record Society,  Records  Series,  vol.
67  (1981),  5,  52-53.  Another commentator reports a more elaborate double bind:  "What would you
do if the Pope were to send over an army and declare  that his only object was to bring the kingdom
back to its Catholic allegiance?  And if he stated at the same time that there was no other way of re-
establishing  the Catholic faith;  and commanded everyone by his apostolic authority to support him?
Whose  side  would  you  be  on  then-the  Pope's or  the  Queen's?"  Graham  Green,  intro.,  John
Gerard. The Autobiography of an Elizabethan, trans. Philip Caraman  (New York:  Longman,  1951),
98.
5.  By 27 Eliz. I, cap.  2 (1585),  the state made it treason for a priest ordained after June  24,  1559
to be present  in  England,  and  made  it a  felony  for  a  lay  person  to  harbor  such  a priest.  For a
complete summary of anti-Catholic statutes adopted under Elizabeth and James I, see J.A. Williams,
"English  Catholicism  Under Charles  II: The Legal  Position,"  Recusant History 7  (1963):  123-43.
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ties  of hidden  gestures,  unclear  pronoun  reference,  altered  pronuncia-
tion-any  addition  to  standard  usage  that  would  create  an  ambiguity.
This is what St. Francis was about  when, asked whether he had seen an
escaping  thief, he protected the fugitive  by answering  (with his pointing
hand hidden in his robe),  "He  came not this way."
Official  anxiety about all of these forms of expression ran pretty  high,
but it  was  the  fourth method  of equivocation,  mental  reservation,  that
stimulated the really sensational scare.6  For the Jesuits endorsed a form
of response which gave the interpreter no indication of its possible ambi-
guities:  a Catholic  in England was  allowed  by this doctrine  to make an
audible  statement  that  would  mislead  the  hearer,  and  to  add  to  it,
silently,  a modification  (or mental reservation) that rendered the entire
sentence true.  For instance:  "I  did not see Father Gerard [ut tibi dicam]
[i.e.,  in order to tell you about him]."7
Mental reservation  was a key strategy in preserving secret identity, and
it was  objectionable  in direct proportion to its tendency  to undermine  a
state  program  increasingly  committed  to policing  personal  identity  on
the basis of religious  affiliation.  As one  court  observed,  the first three
practices-'"equivocation"  proper-posed  no  danger  if identities  were
already  fixed,  whereas  mental  reservation  represented  a  special  threat.
The first three were "easily discovered  if the imposter bee suspected,  but
hee which useth mentall reservacion  cannot possibly bee detected....  "'
Officials  perceived  accurate  detection  of identities  to be  crucial  to  the
state's continued stability:  "the  commonwealth cannot  possibly  stand if
this wicked doctrine bee not beaten  downe and suppressed, for if it once
take  roote  in the hartes  of the  people,  in a  short time  there wilbee  no
faithe, no troth, no trust, and consequently,  all commercing and all con-
tracting will cease, and all civill societies will breake  and bee dissolved."
Civil order came to be equated  with transparent  expression, committing
the  state to  policing referentiality:  "[E]very  man's  estate  in  particuler,
and the state of the realme in generall,  doth depend uppon the truthe and
sincerity  of men's oathes  .... "'
6.  For  a  register of this  alarm,  see  "The  Case  of Concealment or  Mental  Reservation,  April
1613,"  Ellesmere  MS  2191,  printed  in  Anthony  G.  Petti,  ed.,  Recusant Documents from  the
Ellesmere Manuscripts,  Catholic Record Society  Publications, vol. 60 (1968),  345-56 (cited hereafter
as "Castle Chamber Case of Concealment").  And for studies of the degree to which  English loyalists
were prone  to fright, see Carol Z. Weiner,  "The Beleagured  Isle:  A Study  of Elizabethan  and Early
Jacobean Anti-Catholicism,"  Past and Present 51 (1971):  27-62,  and Lacey  Baldwin Smith, Treason
in  Tudor England: Politics  and Paranoia  (Princeton: Princeton  University  Press,  1986).
7.  Treatise of Equivocation, 48-52.
8.  "Castle  Chamber  Case of Concealment,"  251.  The  court  was  that of Castle  Chamber,  the
Irish equivalent  of Star Chamber;  the case  was  that of certain Catholic  grand jurors convicted  of
perjury when they failed to indict recusants and defended their action by claiming that they had been
under no obligation  to present a true bill because of a mental  reservation  they had made when they
swore the oath of their office.  (For an analysis of this episode, see footnotes 34-37 and accompanying
text below.)  Petti prints the  manuscript  report of these Catholics'  trial and  conviction,  composed
and annotated  by Sir John  Davies,  Attorney General  for  Ireland.
9.  "Castle  Chamber Case of Concealment,"  250, 254.
1991]
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Catholic priests and their official  pursuivants thus took up apparently
diametrically opposed  ideological stances.  The Jesuits expressly claimed
an entitlement to secret identity protected  by ambiguous and even silent
speech.  They constructed a privacy which aimed to pass undetected into
and  through  the  public  domain  of the  state,  detaching  from the body
politic the selves hidden from it.  In service of this  goal they conceptual-
ized language as multivalent, unstable, and conventional;  and recognized
a  complex  dialogue  occurring  within  the  Catholic  mind,  in  which
thought  itself  took  on  the  representational  qualities  of  speech  and
writing.
The  official  English  stance  was,  on  every  point,  the  complementary
opposite.  The social  order  itself was  understood  to rest  on the trans-
parency  of religious  identity  and the  language  in which  it was  claimed
and  ascribed.  Though  official  apologists  acknowledged  a  private  zone
beyond  the reach  of state regulation,  they insisted  that the discourse  of
religious  identity  be  pervasively  public,  univocal  and  clear,  and  even
claimed that these characteristics were natural.  They scorned the Jesuits'
notion  of  the  discursively  constituted  self,  insisting  that  the  mind
originates thoughts as things in themselves which then become  available
for representation  in language.
The complementarity  of these positions  is susceptible  of at least two
sorts of explanations.  One is, I think, clearly inadequate.  According to
it, Anglican and Catholic discourses encounter one another with a hostil-
ity derived  from sources internal to each, and external  to the encounter
itself, in a confrontation  of ideology  with textuality,  of oppression  with
resistance,  of clarity  and  univocality  with  linguistic  mischief.  Thus  it
would  be tempting  to invoke  a  Derridean  explanation  of the resulting
conflict, for it seems likely that textuality subverts ideology here.  That is,
if dominant  ideology  in  the Western  tradition  has  posited  "metaphys-
ics"--essentialist thought or a philosophy of presence that founds a sta-
ble hierarchy  of signs and meanings and forces transparency on words by
fiercely  controlling  and  limiting their  meanings-official  control  of the
interpretation  of equivocal  speech  could be regarded  as ideological.  On
the other hand, if "textuality,"  as the sheer uncontrolled  activity of lan-
guage,  proliferates  meanings  and  thus  demonstrates  how  ideology  is
always being deconstructed  by the multivalence,  redundancy,  and  opac-
ity of its own  language, Jesuitical  equivocation could be  said to be sub-
versive  in the ways that textuality  is subversive.
But a model  according  to  which ideology  and  textuality  are  incom-
mensurate and  opposed  ill  suits the relations between  the  English state
and its Catholics: it seems more likely that the two entities defined them-
selves and each other in the context of one another  and of their shared
conflict.  According  to this  more  adequate  explanation,  the  discursive
programs of Jesuits and their Anglican opponents were mutually  consti-
[Vol.  3:  33
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tuted in the diacritics of a high-stakes ideological war.  Heresy and ortho-
doxy  brought  one  another  into  existence,  each  being  necessary  to  the
formation of the other.
Orthodoxy, like heresy, occurred in a process of separating itself from
and incorporating its opposition.  Terry Eagleton suggests that dominant
and  oppressed  ideologies  exist  and  are  mutually  constitutive-a notion
that  is  useful  for English  religious  discourse.  According  to  him,  the
dominant  ideology  "incorporates  within  itself  (not  without  ceaseless
struggle) the codes and forms whereby subordinate classes 'practice' their
relations to the social formation as a whole."  And the strategies of textu-
ality are available  to both.  The  analogy tying ideology  to langue or the
fixed structure of language, and textuality to parole or the unfixed, arbi-
trary speech act is thus broken down: we are free to observe the recipro-
cal  relations  that occur  between  these  elements  in  specific  ideological
"conjunctures."  Eagleton  argues  that "conjunctural  meaning"-mean-
ing in situ, whether in dominant or subordinate ideologies-"constantly
is trying to captivate langue-meaning  and constantly  is being captivated
by  it."'1 0  Polar  positions developed  in  a  diacritical  process  of this sort
will  be rifted  by  contradictions  arising  precisely  from  the  constitutive
activity of incorporation  that each side engages  in and yet repudiates.
As I attempt to show below, the discursive consequence of these inter-
nal  contradictions emerges  twice--once  within the equivocation contro-
versy,  and  again  in  the  paradigm  incorporated  group,  the  "church
papists."  In the equivocation controversy, as it played itself out in courts
of law  and in polemical  encounters,  the consequences  of the diacritics  I
am  describing  emerge  in the  form  of an  uncanny  mirroring,  each  side
reproducing (though without acknowledgement)  the discourse of the self
that  was  heatedly  propounded  by  its  opponent.  Thus  Jesuits,  though
willing to play at parole-the  unfixed, arbitrary speech act-for the pur-
poses of the English  mission,  insisted that conventional  meanings,  once
constructed  by  historical  polemics,  imposed  absolute  limits on  faithful
confession  of Catholic identity.  Though  they  recognized  the fluidity  of
the self and  of identifying  language,  they insisted that both harden  into
fixity in the service of God.  Official Anglicans,  on the other hand, pro-
pounded an inviolate, even natural and prediscursive personal self only to
extend the state's coercive power into the secret  recesses of identity for-
mation;  with  this  contradiction  the  Anglicans  disrupted  their  founda-
tional premise and placed it within the range of historical mutability.
10.  Terry Eagleton,  "Text,  Ideology, Realism,"  in Edward  W. Said, ed.,  Literature  and Society:
Selected Papers  from the English Institute, n.s. 3 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,  1978),
152-57.  Portions of the prior three paragraphs  appeared in substantially  similar form in my article
on  another  diacritics  of  heresy  and  orthodoxy  in  early  modem  England.  See  Janet  E.  Halley,
"Heresy,  Orthodoxy,  and the  Politics  of Religious  Discourse:  The  Case of the  English Family  of
Love,"  Representations 15  (1986):  98,  101-102,  rpt.  in  Stephen  Greenblatt,  ed.,  Representing the
English Renaissance (Berkeley:  University  of California  Press, 1988),  303.
1991]
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The  echoes  in this  system  arise  from  the  fact  that both  Jesuits  and
Anglicans sought group-based control over individual identity formation.
For Jesuits, this meant  using the English mission  to police the religious
identity of English  Catholics, insisting that the native  Catholic  popula-
tion undertake public acknowledgments of Catholic  identity designed  to
preserve the distinctiveness  of the Catholic community even at the cost of
life  and property."'  For the Anglican  state,  it meant  imposing  church
membership  on  a  population  that  was,  at  least  in  devotional  matters,
increasingly polymorphous,  heterogeneous  and  unstable. 2
The  dialectics  of equivocation  thus  leave out  a  social  reality  which
neither side could completely capture: the vast proportion of native Eng-
lish Catholics who declined to assume the rigid identity urged upon them
by the Jesuits, and who peopled the Anglican church with members will-
ing to signify loyalty to the state and yet unwilling to engage in Anglican
communion.  These  "church  papists"-so  called  because  they  main-
tained  a Catholic devotional  life and yet cooperated  with state demands
by  certain  outward  shows  of  conformity-subverted  the  programs
imposed by both sides of the equivocation  controversy, but did so in the
service of a quietistic, conservative  devotional life that posed no substan-
tial  threat to the almost  imperial  forces  bearing  down  upon them from
either  side.  Occupying  the  conjunctural  territory  between  Jesuit  and
Anglican programs for their religious identity, church papists constituted
a  radically  unstable  discourse  of identity,  alternately  captured  by  and
capturing the discourses of self formulated by those who warred to define
their historical meaning.
THE TEXT  OF  STATE
In the trials arising from  the Gunpowder  Plot, Attorney  General  Sir
Edward Coke asserted a state policy that insisted upon referential clarity,
and that branded all deviations from clarity as subversive.  In the trial of
Henry  Garnet,  the Superior  of the Jesuits  in England,  Coke  promoted
equivocation  to  the  first rank  of the Order's  crimes,  calling  Garnet  "a
doctor of Jesuits, that is, a doctor of five DD's, as dissimulation, deposing
of princes,  disposing  of kingdoms,  daunting  and  deterring  of subjects,
and destruction."' 3  And  in the great  trial of the Powder  Men,  where
11.  John  Bossy,  The English Catholic Community, 1570-1850  (New  York: Oxford  University
Press, 1976),  108-130,  provides a detailed history of this conflict between Jesuit missionaries and the
Catholic  gentry  of England,  and  examines  its  effects  on  devotional  practices,  including  going to
church.
12.  See  Patrick  Collinson,  The  Elizabethan  Puritan Movement  (Berkeley:  University  of
California  Press,  1967),  esp.  14  and  part  1, chapter  1, "The  Church  of England  and the  English
Church,"  22-28; and "Towards a Broader Understanding of the Early Dissenting Tradition,"  in C.
Robert Cole and  Michael E.  Moody,  eds.,  The  Dissenting Tradition:  Essays for Leland H.  Carlson
(Athens,  Ohio: Ohio University  Press,  1975),  3-38.
13.  "The Trial of Henry Garnet,  Superior of the Jesuits in  England, at the Guildhall of London,
for a High Treason, being a Conspirator in the  Gunpowder  Plot,"  28  March  1606,  in T.B. Howell,
[Vol.  3:  33
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substantive  issues  of equivocation  did  not  even  arise,  Coke  repeatedly
expressed the state's relationship to English Catholics in terms of a strug-
gle to control discourse.  The offenses he must prosecute, Coke declared,
were  "sine nomine,"  "without  name":  the  highest  treason  was crimen
laesae majestatis, but the accused aimed to destroy not only the King but
the  entire  state,  "even  the deletion of our  whole  name  and  nation."'14
Coke  implies in these  passages that the state is a text, and that the great
question  is whether  Catholic  traitors will  be  allowed  to erase  it  or the
forces of justice will be able  to continue composing it.
Coke's repeated  prosecutorial encounters with the Jesuits thus appear
to be  an historical instance of dominant  "ideology"  insisting on closure
and  punitive constraint  of meanings,  opposed  by a subversive  "textual-
ity,"  a force of linguistic mischief that constantly undoes the neat lexical
controls of its oppressors.  But by figuring the state as a text confronted
with  a linguistic  menace,  Coke  suggests  the paradox  that  renders  this
interaction  a dynamic of mutually constitutive counterforces, for Coke's
metaphor acknowledges that the state and its opponents are made of the
same stuff.
The  resulting  dangers  to  the state  program  were  apparent  from the
very outset of Coke's speech at the trial of Guy  Fawkes and his accom-
plices, when he declared that he would make an unusually copious expo-
sition  of the  case  because  the  facts  were  so  enormous  as  to  escape
language.  He  needs  to talk for a  long  time because,  he  says,  he  must
anticipate the court's inevitable question once he is done: "Quis haec pos-
teris sic narrare poterit, ut facta non ficta esse videantur?"  "Who will be
able  to narrate  these  things  to posterity  so that they  will  appear  to be
fact, not fiction?"' 5
Coke has set in motion a dangerous  paradox.  His Catholic opponents
have so  exceeded  the limits of language that the  state, which  must ally
itself with the abused medium, runs the risk that its proliferating  speech
will appear to be mere fiction,  a tissue of language.  Coke  excoriates the
offenders as the enemies  of language but is unable to guarantee that the
correcting  linguistic  practices  of the  state  will  remain  purely  reliable.
Indeed, in expressing his hopes for the legibility of the text of state, Coke
points  to its dubious  construction, for he desires  only that the events of
the Powder Treason will appear  to be fact ("videantur").  The veracity of
the text of state may be nothing  more than an accomplishment  of art, a
trick of seeming,  a successful  fiction.
These  dangers  were  graphically  displayed  at the  treason  trial of the
ed.,  State Trials, vol.  II (London:  Longman,  1816),  234.  Cited hereafter  as  "The  Trial  of Henry
Garnet."
14.  "The  Gunpowder Trial,"  167; emphasis  mine.
15.  "The  Gunpowder  Trial,"  166.  The  translation  is  mine.  Coke's  own  translation  slightly
obscures the  crux of his  Latin question: "That, when these things shall be related  to posterity,  they
will be reputed  matters  feigned,  not done."
1991]
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Jesuit  Robert  Southwell.  After repeated  tortures at  the hands of Top-
cliffe and  prolonged  imprisonment  in the  Tower,  Southwell  was  finally
brought to the bench as an accused traitor in 1595.  He was charged with
being an ordained priest within her Majesty's realm, an act which parlia-
mentary  statute  27  Eliz.  I,  cap.  2  had  made  treasonous.  Southwell
admitted all the facts alleged in his indictment, but asserted  that the law
was invalid as contrary to the law of God.  One would expect this claim
to precipitate the great conflict of the trial, but it did not.  The jurisdic-
tional question that was  tearing  Europe apart,  the relative  authority  of
crown  and mitre,  was  displaced  onto a  passionate  conflict  over  South-
well's powers of equivocation.
Topcliffe had finally managed to capture Southwell through the aid of
Anne Belamy, a young woman of Catholic family whom he had arrested,
raped, demoralized, and married off to one of his assistants.  She not only
informed  this  legendary  pursuivant  of  Southwell's  residence  in  her
father's house, but  also related  that the  Jesuit had  told her  that if she
were ever  asked,  even under oath,  "whether  she  hade seene  a Priste or
not, she might lawfully  say not, though  she had seen  one, keepinge this
meaning in her mynde,  that she did not  see  any, with intent to bewray
him.""6  After she had testified  to this exchange  Southwell  was  allowed
his first  opportunity  to make  an uninterrupted  answer  to  his  accusers.
He made a lengthy and eloquent defense of equivocation,  closing with a
challenge to Coke to say that he would not adopt the practice himself if it
were his only means  of saving the Queen.
Although  Southwell was required to remain silent throughout most of
his  trial, it  is  remarkable  that the  court  finally  permitted  him  to speak
when  he offered to defend  the conditions  under  which  his own  speech
could bear meaning.  But what followed is even more striking.  Coke was
"moved  in choler"  and repeatedly  called  Southwell  "boy-priest";  Lord
Chief Justice  Popham interrupted  to  declare  that  Southwell's  doctrine
would  "supplant  all  Justice";  and  Southwell finally  responded  that the
doctrine  supported  justice  by  denying  cooperation  with  unjust
interlocutors:
...  and as he was goinge forward to explaine his meanynge, he was
continually  interrupted,  so  as  they  would  by  no  meanes  permytte
him to say any more.  Then he desired them to beare with him, sey-
inge they would not suffer him to prove what he had sayde, allwayes
denyinge that ever he hade sayd anie suche thinge,  in such sorte, as
they  obiected.  Heare  againe  Topclyffe  begaine  to  be  earneste  in
most ralinge maner, as is alwayes  usuall with him....  But he was
some  [soon]  willed  to  surcease.  And  some  thing  concerninge  the
inditment only beinge said to the Jurye, they were sent into a house
16.  Janefle, Robert Southwell the  Writer,  81.
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aparte, to consulte  of their verdicte.  7
Southwell's  will to  defend  the doctrine of equivocation  set off a rau-
cous shouting match.  None of the key participants could restrain himself
from interjecting, and yet no one saw to it that Southwell was kept to the
painfully  abbreviated  speech  he  had  been  allowed  theretofore.  Both
Southwell  and Coke permitted  the  topic of equivocation  to provoke an
explosion  of  talking,  each  man  vying  for  the  chance  to  "explaine  his
meanynge."  The Jesuit was not allowed  to speak  publicly at any  length
again:  soon the jury returned with a verdict of guilty, and Southwell was
relegated  to the  theatre  of martyrdom  and  his brilliant management  of
the spectacle of a godly  death.
The  officials in this scene had several  reasons for finding equivocation
particularly  threatening.  Topcliffe  rejoiced  to  expose  a  practice  which
undermined  his  crude  but  effective  intelligence-gathering;  Popham
expressed his alarm that the doctrine would disable the courts by render-
ing oaths inscrutable;  and Coke undertook to resist the doctrine's denial
of  the  sovereignty,  religious  and  temporal,  of  the  English  Crown.
Despite their unity in alarm, however, these three officials urged dissimi-
lar responses to Southwell, interrupted each other as well  as their defend-
ant, and momentarily  lost control over the orderly exposition of the text
of state.  Their  unseemly  scramble  with Southwell and  one  another  for
the floor suggests that underlying the challenge to the political structure
brought by the Jesuits'  doctrine was a bid for the control of language and
the social  production of meaning-a bid which  Topcliffe,  Popham  and
Coke intended to defeat.  But the mere presence  of a Jesuit reserving the
power to equivocate,  even as it precipitated  the oppositional  strategy of
state insistence on univocal  expression, seems to have subverted the very
clarity and order which Coke would attribute to orthodox discourse.
THE DIACRITICS  OF  THE  POLEMICAL  ENCOUNTER
The  chief  pugilists  in  the  polemical  controversy  over  equivocation
were Thomas  Morton, who served  the English  Church and  Crown first
as Dean of Gloucester and then as  Bishop of Durham, and Robert Par-
sons, an English Jesuit who  worked largely from the continent as a mas-
termind  and  controversialist  for  the  English  mission.  Their  polemics
represent  an  implacable  disagreement  about  what  language  is,  about
what constitutes  an  audience,  and about what  kind of self is created  in
the activity of discourse.  It deceptively suggests that their models of dis-
course are mutually  exclusive.
Parsons  insisted that internal speech was not only possible but legally
permissible.  Morton  insisted that speech  always occurred  in the public
17.  Ibid.,  82.  Brackets and ellipses  are retained from Janelle's  text; italics  indicating expanded
contractions are not.
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arena governed by law, and for that reason, it must be plainly referential.
Within  these  apparently  coherent  linguistic  and  political  programs
appear a number of striking contradictions  which  suggest that referen-
tiality and identity were, in fact, more problematic than either side could
afford  to admit.
The Jesuits
In establishing the moral justification for all four sorts of equivocation,
the Jesuit propounders  of this theory  relied on the argument that part of
a true  statement  could be  made, silently,  by  a  speaker  to him- or her-
self.'I  Following  Aristotle,  they divided  propositions into four kinds-
vocal, written, mental, and mixed--each  of which  could be true or false.
Anyone with a truth to express could express it in any of these modes: he
could  speak it, write it, frame it in a mental proposition,  or mix  any of
these three.  A statement was no less a statement if half of it was spoken
and half written--or if half was  spoken aloud  and half spoken  silently.
And so a mental reservation  did not entail an untruth.  It merely compli-
cated the manner  in which  the truth was  expressed. 9
The whole defense  of mental reservation therefore  rests  on the asser-
tion that a mental statement could be logically equivalent to a vocal one
which it  completes.  That  assertion, in  turn,  depends  on  a  representa-
tional theory described by  Parsons:
[A]ccording  to Aristotle, as the externall  writing  representeth  vnto
vs a mans speach,  so the externall  speach  representeth  vnto  vs the
internall  speach, affection,  or asseueration  of the mind.  Wherefore
of this there can be no controuersy but that there  is a true internall
speach  of the mind.  ...  20
For  Parsons,  writing  represents  speech  just  as  speech  represents  the
mental proposition.  Internal speech is absorbed into the scheme of refer-
ents, becoming  a signifier and so introducing the complexity of represen-
tation into the mind.
Parsons' notion of internal speech  appears to open up a space for pri-
vate discourse that Morton would firmly close.2'  Parsons asserts that the
18.  Though  Anne  Belamy was doubtless  not the only woman who  was expected  to protect the
Catholic community by equivocal speech, the texts examined in this section occlude the participation
of women  in the struggle to define  orthodoxy and  heresy.  This absence should not be taken to be
referential.  Indeed,  the  roles of Catholic  women  were  so complex  and  crucial  that, according  to
Bossy,  the Catholic  community  owed  its persistence  to what  he terms a  matriarchy.  Bossy,  The
English  Catholic Community,  150-60.
19.  Treatise of  Equivocation,  12-13.
20.  Robert  Parsons, A  Treatise tending to mitigation  towardes  Catholicke-Subiectes in  England
(1607),  325-26 (cited hereafter as Mitigation).  Parsons' text answers an attack on equivocation  made
by  Thomas  Morton  in his  lengthy  A fvll  satisfaction concerning  a dovble  romish  iniquitie; hainous
rebellion,  and  more  then  heathenish  aequivocation  (London,  1606).  Morton,  in  his  turn, was
responding to the manuscript  Treatise of Equivocation.
21.  The  discussion  of privacy  that  follows draws  on  the  argument  that  underlies  Barrington
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Aristotelian  term  "enunciative"  describes  not statements  which may  be
heard  by  an  audience  but  rather  statements  which  affirm  or  deny.
"Hence  then  appeareth,"  he concludes,  "that  it  dependeth  not of the
hearer to make the speech enuntiatiue, or not, but it is sufficient that it be
so of it selfe, and of his own nature."22  The Jesuit theory of equivocation
constructs the self as a discursive world sufficient unto itself, encompass-
ing  both  sign  and  signified  within  the  mind  and  flatly  excluding  any
necessity  for social intercourse.
Jesuit proponents  of equivocation  defended the realm of discursive pri-
vacy  which  they  created  by  invoking  a  Catholic's  personal  right  and
capacity  to determine  the jurisdictional  validity  of any  question put  to
him or  her.  The  manuscript  Treatise of Equivocation observes that the
"order  of law"  requires  that one must "answer  directly"  only when  the
inquisitor  exhibits  every  condition of legitimate  authority.  To summa-
rize, those conditions require  that the inquisitor:
1) be a lawful superior, whose authority rests on a valid commission
of power from the monarch  or the commonwealth  (a notion of the
legally constrained  devolution of legal  authority);
2)  have "autority  over the p[er]son whome he examineth"  (a notion
of personal jurisdiction);
3)  restrain his inquiries  to matters within his competence  (a notion
of subject matter jurisdiction);
4)  proceed according  to a just law, because  "a judge in the execu-
tion of an vniust law is no judge"  (a notion of natural law  limits to
the legitimacy  of positive law);  and
5)  proceed only "in cases which are publicke and manifest, or whan
great  suspitions  and  p[re]sumptions,  or  commoun  reportes,  do
seeme  to condemne  the partye,  or sufficient  testimony  to convince
hym"  (a notion of probable  cause).23
Only  when  these  conditions  are  not  met  is  the  respondent  free  to
equivocate.  Particularly if the form of equivocation he chooses is mental
reservation, his course of action seems to suggest that he assumes a man-
tle of inviolable  privacy  and  withdraws briefly  from  the social  interac-
tion.  Thus Parsons  instructs  that, when  these conditions  are  not  met,
"then  [the Catholic] may answere, as though he were alone, and no man
by[.]
'' 1
24
Moore,  Jr.,  Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural  History (Armonk,  New  York:  M.E.  Sharpe,
1984).  Moore contends that the contours of personal privacy  drawn by any culture are coterminous
with  the  contours  of the  personal  right  to freedom  from  legal  interference  and  thus outline  the
structure of the legal system.  The present study  differs in methodology  and subject  from Moore's,
focusing  on  a  conflict  over privacy  and  the  reach of the  law,  and  suggesting  that,  wherever  such
conflict exists, it may be impossible to extract a single structure of privacy or of the personal identity
that depends on  it.
22.  Mitigation, 330.
23.  Treatise of Equivocation, 68-69.
24.  Mitigation, 342.
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But a  case of conscience  composed  to  train priests preparing  for the
English  mission  demonstrates  that  an  equivocator's  reply  does  not
merely  construct a  shell of privacy,  but rather constitutes  privacy  as a
social and legal relationship  between the Catholic and his inquisitor. The
case  involves  a priest  with  the given  name of Peter, confronted  with a
judge  without  legitimate  jurisdiction  who  nevertheless  demanded  to
know whether he were named Peter. Jn this circumstance the priest was
free to answer  "No":
The  interrogation  of  a  judge,  by  its  very  nature,  means  this:
"According  to the power  I have and the jurisdiction  I have  in this
case,  I ask you to  confess to  me as  your superior whether  you are
Peter."  Wherefore,  if he is  not a legitimate judge,  my  reply  is to a
man, not a judge; and so, by denying that I was ever called by that
name,  I do not simply deny that I was ever called by that name, but
I deny that  I am  "...  .Peter  who is bound to reply to you as to a judge
endowed with the sort of  power and jurisdiction which you have.'"23
This answer defines  speaker and audience diacritically.  The inquisitor
ceases to be a judge when he assumes a legally deficient relationship vis i
vis the speaker, though he remains a present, public audience throughout
the interaction.  The justification  of equivocation  therefore  turns on the
shifting,  socially  contingent  identity  of the  speaker.  The  priest,  who
might  in another  social  setting  "be"  Peter,  is  not  Peter when  claiming
that name would  render him  "Peter-who-owes-a-duty-of-responding-to-
this-judge."  Even when he frames a large chunk of his answer as a silent
self-address,  the priest defines  himself in terms of the  legal relationship
he bears to his interlocutor.
The representation  admitted  into Parsons'  scheme of the self is, as  he
himself acknowledged  elsewhere, a highly  unstable thing.  Several years
before the equivocation controversy, Parsons argued to English Catholics
that  they  must  violate  the  English  law  requiring  their  attendance  at
Anglican church  services.26  The  fact that Catholics  had been jailed for
refusing to go to church,  Parsons argued,
doth make this  abstaining from Church, to  be a proper  & peculiar
signe of a true Catholike, now, if it were not before; and the yeelding
in the same (especially if a man be called to publicke  triall about it)
to be a flatte and euident denying of God, and of his faith.  For what
doth make a thing to bee a proper and peculiar signe, but the iudge-
ment and  opinion of men?  The bush  of the Tauerne, is a  signe  of
25.  In P.J. Holmes, ed.,  Elizabethan Casuistry, Catholic Record Society,  Records Series, vol.  67
(1981),  64  (emphasis  added).  Holmes  has  translated  from  the  Latin  all  material  except  that  in
quotations,  which  the manuscript  gives  in English.
26.  23  Eliz.  I,  cap.  1 (1559).  Subsequent enactments  imposed increasingly  harsh  penalties  and
defined  additional  substantive  offenses.  See  Williams,  "English  Catholicism under  Charles  II:  the
Legal Position,"  125-27.
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wine,  because men commonly  take it  so.27
The  meaning of a  sign, Parsons  recognizes, is an historically  contingent
product  of  social  interaction.  If  no  Catholics  had  refused  to  go  to
church,  or if the state had failed to adopt  a statute requiring  their pres-
ence there, then  refusing to go to church  would not have become a sign
of Catholic identity.
This passage  is useful not only because it suggests  the continuity of a
Jesuit  understanding  that  language  is  conventional,  but  also because  it
reminds us that the priest  named  Peter is engaged  not merely  in a self-
protective ruse but in a struggle for the authority to adjudicate the proper
relations of crown and mitre.  Parsons' volley in the controversy was part
of a Jesuit insistence  that English Catholics  acquire a fixed public iden-
tity as  Catholics by their refusal to go to church-by their "recusance"
from the Anglican  church.
When Parsons  opined that language  was purely conventional,  he was
arguing not that Catholics could make the act of going to church  mean
whatever  they liked, but that  historical conditions had made the act of
going to church "mean"  the actor's Protestantism and thus, for a Catho-
lic,  his apostacy.  What is not apparent from  Parsons'  exposition of this
dialectic  is his own role,  as polemicist, in hardening  it, in attempting  to
fix the boundaries of Catholic identity and to impose those boundaries on
English  Catholics.  Parsons'  argument  represents  precisely  what  lay
Catholics most resented about the Jesuits-their effort to dictate terms of
martyrdom to devout believers who wished  to find a middle way.  In this
propaganda  effort,  as  again  later  in the dispute  over  the Oath of Alle-
giance, Parsons and his fellow Jesuits exhibit a highly acute awareness  of
meaning  as  an everchanging  product  of cultural  interactions,  and  thus
seem to justify Morton's attacks on them as subverters of the natural and
stable reference of signs in the political sphere.  But at the same time the
Jesuits display a willingness to constrain Catholics to the single meaning
which their semiology inflexibly assigns to the act in question.  And they
establish a kinship with Morton and Coke not only in  this method, but
also  in their enforcement of a meaning created  by the state.
The Anglican State
The Anglican state established  an ideology of truth, sincerity and per-
sonal  identity  that  differs,  apparently  diametrically,  from  that  of the
Jesuits. But the ideological  simplicity of the official program  is undercut
by contradictions that reveal  it to be a constitutive move in a struggle for
control over the definition  of religious identity.
Morton  established  the  official  attack  on  Parsons'  assertion  that
27.  Robert Parsons, A briefe discovrse containing  certaine  reasons, why Catholikes refuse to goe to
church, sig.  C9v-ClOr. (Douai,  1601).  The first edition of this tract  was published  in  1580.
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thoughts are signifiers: "But no mentall or inward conceit of the minde is
ordeined of God as a signe to expresse or signifie (as  words and writings
doe) but as a thing signified hath need to be expressed and expounded."28
Morton insists  that mental  propositions  are simple things in themselves,
to  be  distinguished  from  the  speech  and  writing  that  represent  them,
either faithfully or falsely.  To represent faithfully is to rely on the intrin-
sic  and  immutable  signification  of  linguistic  signs,  what  Morton  in
another place calls "the  naturall  propertie  of the words themselues."29
Morton's image  of the speaking and self-describing self is equally  uni-
tary.  Underlying the self is a stable, constant conscience  against  which
the  truth  and  falsehood  of  self-referential  speech  and  writing  can  be
tested.  "Mens non potest non intelligere  quod intelligit: The mind cannot
possibly but thinke that which it thinketh,"  and it cannot think both that
one is and that one is not a priest.  "[T]ruth  and falsity doth consist only
in  the  conformity  or contrareity  of the  signification  of the  words,  and
direct intention of the mind  . . .,,a
Unlike Parsons, whose theory of the equivocating self expressly recog-
nizes privacy to be a public construct, Morton's attack on the concept  of
internal  speech  is  predicated  on  the  illusion  that  personal  privacy  is
inviolable.
Now  because  there  is  no  man  of sound  braines,  but  he  knoweth
before he  speake,  what his tongue  vttereth,  there can  be no neede
that by speech he should interpret his owne meaning  to himselfe, no
more then  a man may be properly said to steale his owne goods,  or
commit adultery  with his owne wife: because both these are actions
ad extra, that is, without a man, and haue relation to others then to
our selues.3'
This assertion delineates the two familiar spheres of private and of public
life: the former is the equivalent of a man's "self,"  while the latter places
him in relation to others.  Within the private sphere-that is,  within the
boundaries  of the self-Morton  includes  a  man's  wife,  his  possessions,
and his own meanings.  Whatever  goes on there, Morton claims, escapes
legal control.  In the public sphere occur legally  cognizible actions: adul-
tery  (with  another  man's  wife),  theft  (of  another  man's  goods),  and
speech (to another man  as audience).
Representing  the  self as  a bounded,  coherent  internal  space  autono-
28.  Thomas  Morton,  A fvil satisfaction concerning a  dovble romish iniqvitie; hainous rebellion,
and more then heathenish  aequiuocation (London,  1606),  56; emphasis mine (cited hereafter as Ajvll
satisfaction). In  the copy I consulted of this work, at the Henry E. Huntington Library in Pasadena,
California, pagination commences at page  1 three  times.  All  page cites  are from the first sequence
except  those marked  with an asterisk,  which  are from the third  sequence.
29.  Thomas Morton, The encovnter against  M.  Parsons,  by a  review of his last Sober Reckoning,
and his exceptions vrged in the Treatise of Mitigation (London,  1610),  128.
30.  Morton, A fvll satisfaction, 52-53*.
31.  Ibid.,  69*.
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mous of legal sanction, Morton wittily argues that any person who could
silently  address  himself would  also be  able  thereby to  deceive  himself:
"This  were to distract a man from himselfe.  Therefore this naturall  rea-
son taken  from the speech of man with himselfe, might best befit a pure
naturall,  or some person  distracted;  namely, such  a one as being beside
himselfe can best talke with himselfe."32  Rejecting the doubling and rep-
resentational slippage that he finds in the Jesuit model of the self, Morton
proposes a form of personal identity that is neatly  unitary.
As against this encapsulated  self, Morton posits speech  as an activity
always undertaken  within a public realm explicitly governed by law and
by  the  sovereign's  power  to interdict.  All  representation,  whether  by
spoken or written signs, is thrown into an arena that lies within the legiti-
mate power  of the sovereign  and her  agents.  It was as one  such  agent
that Morton beckoned:  "Loquere...  vt te videam: Speake...  my friend
that  I  may  see  thee." 3  The  distribution  of action  in  this  sentence  is
highly  instructive.  The speaker's role is simply to speak;  it remains for
the listener to determine,  on the basis of what he hears, who has spoken.
Particularly  in  a  political  struggle  that  turns on  personal  identity,  the
listener's ability  to  transform  language heard into  a person seen  tips a
discursive  balance of power strongly  in favor of the interpreter.
In the audience relation which Morton seeks to establish, an epistemo-
logical  increment, from aural  to ocular proof, accrues  to an  interpreter
who  aims  not  to  comprehend  some  external  referent  of the  speaker's
works,  but rather  to  know  the  speaker's  personal  identity.  For  all  its
appealing  familiarity  ("Speake, friend..  ."), Morton's  voice commands
open  and public  speech, requires  its own  pivotal  role  as  audience,  and
insists that the purpose  of this social  discourse is the listener's power to
fix promptly and accurately the speaker's identity in all  its unitary neat-
ness.  In opposition to the discursive privacy apparently advanced by the
Jesuits,  Morton constructs a thoroughly political  world of speech.
We might  call this invention  a theory of jurisdiction, and  note that  it
allows the exercise of state power to coerce speech, to create the lexicons
according  to  which  it  will  be  interpreted,  and  to privilege  or  punish
speakers on the basis of their utterances as interpreted by the state.  Mor-
ton's argument would  leave to the private discretion of English citizens,
however, the cultivation of their own thoughts.  Like the statutes  them-
selves,  his  formulation  draws  a  boundary  to  the  state's  jurisdictional
reach  at the  perimeter of the private self.
It is precisely here, however, that the analogy  Morton offers-between
the private worlds of marriage, personal possession of property, and pri-
vate  thought-returns  and  ominously  suggests  its  closure.  For it  sug-
32.  Ibid.
33.  Ibid.
1991]
15
Halley: Equivocation and the Legal Conflict Over Religious Identity In Early Modern England
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1991Yale  Journal of Law  & the  Humanities
gests  not  merely  that  the  contours  of personal  devotional  privacy  are
drawn by the state as it withholds its powers from that domain, but more
strikingly that the state creates the legal content of a privacy that is only
ostensibly autonomous of it.  The self that Morton constructs, after all, is
no intrapsychic  isolate.  It comprises  all persons  (e.g.,  wives)  and things
(e.g.,  personal  property)  with  which  the  law  itself endows  individuals,
whether  through the legal status of marriage  or the legal recognition  of
property  rights.  For all  its  apparent simplicity  and  coherence,  it  is  an
exceedingly  complex  set of intrapersonal  and material  relationships,  all
of which take the shape they do through the action of legal enforcement.
Perhaps  the crudest  example  of this creation-as-invasion  of personal
privacy  appears  in  the  record  of  a  1613  proceeding  against  Catholic
grand jurors in Castle Chamber, Dublin.  The defendants had refused to
pronounce  a true bill against certain recusants.  When questioned about
their grand jury service, they related that "when  they tooke that generall
oathe [to fulfill the duties of grand jurors], they had a speciall reservacion
or exception  in theire  mindes of all such thinges as should  touch theire
conscience or religion."34  Charged with perjury, they placed in issue the
state's  power  to construct  their private  intentions by  denying  that they
bore any intention to deceive.  In this they followed Parsons, who gave as
the equivocator's  reasoning:
...  it is euident that my intention  is not to deceaue in this proposi-
tio[n],  but  to  defend  my  selfe  against  the  captious,  and  iniurious
demandes  of  an  vnlawfull  Iudge,  I  speaking  a  truth  in  it  selfe
according to my meaning, though he taking it otherwise is deceaued
therby, but without  any  fault of mine.35
Against  this private  assertion  of privately  held  meaning,  the  Dublin
court exercised  a power not  merely to infer from the  facts as shown  an
intention to deceive, but to hold that such an intention is an inescapable
element of any  act of mental  reservation.
And  this  secrett  addicion  and  reservacion,  say  they,  doth  clearly
acquitt  him  that  useth  it  from  ling  and  falshoode,  though  that
which  is  expressed  bee  mearely  false,  and that which  is  concealed
bee reserved  in his minde with a purpose to deceave him to whome
hee speaketh.
But the contrary was clearely resolved: videlicet, that an untruthe
uttered  with  a  purpose  to  deceave  is  a  lie,  notwithstanding  any
secret reservation  or limitacion  in the mind of him which doth utter
it.
36
34.  "Castle  Chamber Case  of Concealment,"  246.
35.  Mitigation,  346.
36.  "Castle Chamber  Case  of Concealment,"  252.  This  passage  appears in  Davies'  marginal
annotations.  Id.,  255 n.l.
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The official interpreter  induces from his own deception the fact that the
Catholic speakers  have lied:  he then deduces, from the principle that all
lies involve an  intention to  deceive, the fact  that the speakers  harbored
such an intention.  The grand jurors' private understanding of the partic-
ular intention in question, or of the structure of the privacy in which that
act  of intention  took  place,  finds  no place  in the  official  analysis.  The
totality with which this program appropriates  the very sphere of private
meaning which it has created is indicated in a prescription adopted both
by Morton  and by  the court of Castle Chamber:
To know  in what  sense of words we must  take any  oath, the  doc-
trine of Isidore is infallible:  Though man vse neuer  so great art and
cunning in swearing, yet God doth value the oath according to the
sense of him, to whom the oath is made."
Divine omniscience  is understood  to take the side of the audience,  ren-
dering its interpretation definitive, and obliterating the very privacy upon
which  the Anglican  discursive  program rests.
THE CHURCH  PAPISTS
As the Jesuits  and the Anglican state battled to control  the discourse
of religious  identity,  the  very  population  whose  identity  was  most  at
stake  fell  silent.  Lay  Catholics  in  England  recused  themselves  from
attendance  at  Anglican  services  with  great  reluctance;  as  the  historian
Caroline M. Hibbard has noted, "[w]e  know from numerous studies that
the  decision to  cease  attending  parish  services  came  painfully to many
laymen, and might be reached  only after years,  even decades,  of waver-
ing."3  Until  a crisis in which a  church papist either abandoned  his or
her Catholic identity or was forced by the state into flagrant disobedience
of  anti-Catholic  statutes,  he  or  she  strategized  persistently  to  remain
incorporated  within  Catholic and Anglican  discourses  of religious iden-
tity.  Though the crises of apostacy and of persecuted  resistance  have an
inevitable  glamor,  church papists  made their  discursive contribution to
the dialectics  of religious identity by their wavering.
As  the Anglican  discursive program grappled  with the one developed
in response to it by the Jesuits, each side displayed the contradictions  of
its opponent, a  process that Eagleton  describes  as  incorporation. 3 9  But
because they played a deeply equivocal role in these diacritics, the church
papists require  us to  take Eagleton's  concept  of incorporation  still fur-
ther.  Lay Catholics in England persisted in attending church despite Jes-
uit insistence  that they  refrain,  and persisted  in using  Catholic rites  at
37.  Morton,  A  fvll satisfaction, 86-87  (quoting  Isidore,  De summo  bono,  Book  2).  See also
"Castle  Chamber  Case of Concealment,"  253  (also quoting  this passage of Isidore).
38.  Caroline  M.  Hibbard,  "Early  Stuart  Catholicism:  Revisions and  Re-Revisions,"  Journal  of
Modern History 52(1)  (1980):  17.
39.  See  footnote  10 and  accompanying text above.
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home  despite  the  difficulties  in  finding  a  priest  and  keeping  him  safe.
They  baptised  their  children  twice,  accepted  marriage  at  church,  and
strategized for burial in the hallowed ground of local churchyards even if
they could  have it only by force or stealth.'
However,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  think  that  the  church  papists'
exploitation of the instability of these cultural practices justifies a conclu-
sion that they were embarked upon a program of subversion.  Their very
ability to pursue a wavering course probably rested on their firm embed-
dedness in local power arrangements.  Unless a lay Catholic had the bad
luck  to  live  in  a  county  alight  with  anti-Catholic  enthusiasm  or  to
become caught up in the identity wars, he or she most likely engaged  in
"a long  tradition of civility  and tacit  understanding  between Protestant
and Catholic,"  often marked by "private arrangements"  and broken only
occasionally  by  incidents  of  enforcement  which,  upon  investigation,
"usually  turn  up  the  familiar  motives  for  local  feuding-personality,
property,  and  prestige."'"  And,  as  Bossy  recognizes,  attendance  at
church  may  not  always  have been  an unwilling  act of compliance  with
the penal  law:
[Catholic gentry] felt in their bones that differences of religious prac-
tice were extremely  bad for  the social  order and political  stability;
that since at least the  middle of the  [sixteenth]  century  forces had
been  at  work  towards  the  lower  end  of  the  English  social  scale
which were  threatening  to bring in an  anarchic congregationalism.
•  . .In  these circumstances,  to  cease  to attend one's  parish church
must  appear,  to  oneself  and  to  neighbours  whose  opinions  one
respected,  a grave dereliction  of social duty and a shocking example
to sectaries  and separatists.42
On the one hand, therefore,  the church papists' discourses of religious
identity  are rifted with practices  of textuality that, notwithstanding  any
facile  equation of textuality  with  subversion,  are bare of deconstructive
power.  But  in their daily  life church  papists simultaneously  challenged
the key assumption of both Anglican and Jesuit participants  in the equiv-
ocation controversy:  that they had the power to define what and who  a
Catholic was.
The  historiographical  difficulties  posed  by  this  challenge  make  the
most concise  description  of it.  The assimilation  of the  church  papists
within the Anglican nation convinced one historian, John Bossy, that the
state  succeeded  in  extinguishing  the  Catholic  community;43  he  con-
40.  Hibbard,  "Early  Stuart  Catholicism,"  18.
41.  Ibid,  4;  see  also  Elliot  Rose,  Cases of Conscience: Alternatives Open  to  Recusants and
Puritans  under Elizabeth  I  and James I (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975),
11-113.
42.  Bossy,  The English Catholic Community,  124.
43.  Ibid.,  108-130.
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cluded, "[tihe  history of Elizabethan Catholicism is a progress from iner-
tia  to  inertia  in  three  generations.""  But  J.C.H.  Aveling  drew  the
opposite  conclusion,  noting  instead the  covert survival  of church  papist
families:  "It  was  the  Church-papists  who  saved  the  Catholic  commu-
nity."4  Bossy's and Aveling's divergent assessments reproduce in histo-
riography  precisely  the  struggle  to  define  what  a  Catholic  was  that
preoccupied  Morton  and  Parsons,  and call for  an awareness  of the dis-
cursive  constitution  of the  very  group  identities  upon  which  historical
conclusions  might be based:  "The  problem,"  Hibbard demonstrates,  "is
whether  to  accept  the  Roman  definition  of 'Catholic'  . . . or  to  admit
some validity to the English community's self-definition, which  drew the
line not at [church]  attendance, but at communion."46
Under  these  circumstances  the  historiographical  practice  of quanti-
fying those bearing an English Catholic identity signals the resurgence of
precisely the  moral  debate that split Jesuits  and lay Catholics:  whether
Catholics were obligated to dismantle, or merely to survive, the Anglican
Settlement.  Most English Catholics-unless and until they found them-
selves  forced  to  take a  rigid  position  resisting  the state-engaged  in  a
constantly adaptive and even opportunistic strategy of passive resistance.
So  engaged,  they  belied  both  Morton  and  Parsons;  their  adventitious
combination  of signifying  practices  defeated  Morton's  insistence  on  a
univocal discourse of religious identity even as it complied with the letter
of the  law;  and  their  diffident  response  to Jesuit  pressure  to  assume  a
rigid and transparent Catholic identity decentered the mission and estab-
lished a set of practices even more complexly internal than those under-
pinning the practices of equivocation and mental reservation.
Clearly the  cost of this strategy  was that lay Catholics  lost  access  to
the public discourse about their own identity, instead becoming the bear-
ers of others' meanings.  To this extent, they were complicitous with the
discourse  that oppressed  them.  But they  did not and indeed  could not
retreat  into  a  privacy  remote  from  that  public  discourse.  Their  very
refusal  to disobey  English statutes  requiring  their attendance  at church
disauthorized  Jesuit efforts to control the definition of an English Catho-
lic  at the  same  time that  it destabilized  the  claimed  univocality  of the
Anglican  communion.  Both  conservative  and  highly  opportunistic  in
their signifying  practices, both  concessive  and resistant  in their engage-
44.  Bossy, "The Character  of Elizabethan  Catholicism,"  Past and Present 21  (1962):  39-57.
45.  J.C.H.  Aveling,  The  Handle and the  Axe:  The  Catholic Recusants  in  England from
Reformation to Emancipation (London:  Blond and  Briggs,  1976),  162.
46.  Hibbard,  "Early  Stuart Catholicism,"  17  n.45;  see also id.,  15-17.  See also A.D.  Wright,
"Catholic  History,  North and  South,"  Northern History 14  (1978):  126,  127  ("The fluctuations  not
only in the application  of the penal  laws but  in the tests by which those  laws defined  recusancy are
surely the reason why confirmedly conscious Catholics  cannot be separated  ...  from the penumbra
of recusants.  The only distinction  which  can be made,  arguably,  is from case  to case,  from time to
time, from area  to area, depending  on the terms of proscription  in force as much as  on the level  of
application  or efficiency  of detection in  the enforcement  of the penal  laws.").
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ment with the problems of Catholic identity, the so-called church papists
incorporated  the  contradictions  of  a  diacritical  discourse  of  the  self
within their own silent opacity.
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